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Implementing the 
“One-Child-per-Couple” 
Population Program in 
Rural China: 
National Goals and 
Local Politics
Tyrene White
INTRODUCTION
In September of 1980 the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party took the unprecedented step of publishing an “Open Letter” to all 
Party and Youth League members, calling on them to take the lead in the 
drive to control population growth. The population program, which limited 
most couples to one child, allowed a second birth on a case-by-case basis 
where special circumstances warranted, and prohibited a third or more 
births,' constituted one of the most ambitious regulatory policies China had 
undertaken. It required a large percentage of the population to alter its be­
havior in very personal, intimate ways. Verbal compliance and passive 
acceptance at the group or mass level had to give way to active involvement 
in family planning by a multitude of discrete individuals, whose number was 
growing at a rapid rate.^ Moreover, because 79 percent of the population was 
rural, meeting the stated goal of holding the population to 1.2 billion by the 
year 2000 hinged on the capacity of the regime to make the great majority of 
couples of childbearing age throughout the countryside refrain from having a
I wish to thank A. Doak Barnett, Thomas Bernstein, Merilee S. Grindle, David M. Lampton, 
and R. William Liddle for their comments and suggestions. Also, a special thanks to Professor 
Chen Chung-min for his invaluable help and guidance during the spring of 1982 in China.
' Renmin Rihao (People’s Daily), Sept. 25, 1980, 1.
China Daily Commentator, Dec. 28, 1982, 4, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily 
Report: China (hereafter fR/5), Dec. 29, 1982, K15.
THE “ONE-CHILD-PER-COUPLE” PROGRAM 285
second or additional child for the duration of their childbearing years. In 
turn, the fate of the “Four Modernizations” hinged on the success of this 
strict policy for population control.
During the previous three decades of socialist development, China’s econ­
omy had suffered the ill effects of unbridled population growth. For example, 
grain production is estimated to have increased at an average annual rate of 
2.3 percent between 1957 and 1978, but per capita consumption increased 
only slightly, from 306 to 318 kilograms. Urban housing space increased by 
493 million square meters, but per capita housing was down from 4.5 square 
meters in the early 1950s to 3.6 in 1983. Perhaps most distressing of all, 
arable land per capita fell from .2 hectares in 1949 to .1 hectares in 1983, an 
amount less than one-third the world average.^
Thus, a leadership that had staked its legitimacy on the promise ofimprov- 
ing the livelihood of Chinese citizens could see all too clearly the implica­
tions of failing to clamp down on population growth. During the 1970s efforts 
had been made to encourage the use of birth control and family planning, 
resulting in a significant decline in the population growth rate (see table 
10.1). Because of the demographic composition of the population, however, 
China faced another baby boom in the 1980s, which if left unchecked would 
place an unbearable burden on an already taxed economy and doom the 
Four Modernizations drive to failure. Given the weight of their concerns, it 
seemed a small but necessary step to move from “encouraging” only one 
child per couple to “promoting” and “advocating” it. In practice, however, 
the policy distance traveled between 1977 and 1980 was great. The pressure 
on rural couples rose dramatically, threatening long-held views on, and mo­
tives for, childbearing that were incompatible with a one-child household. 
The decentralized regulatory process that had worked well previously was 
now strained by demands for new regulations and, more important, the re­
sources to enforce them. The administrative apparatus and technical deliv­
ery system that had been adequate for less ambitious family-planning goals 
were now strained under the weight of strict quotas and increasing demand 
for contraceptive services. And finally, these problems were compounded by 
the very success of the ongoing process of agricultural reform, which had a 
negative impact on the enforcement of population control.
Although China’s leadership acknowledged that a successful population 
policy was the cornerstone of its modernization effort, its implementation 
posed several dilemmas. Foremost among these was the disjuncture between 
long- and short-term priorities. The control of population growth was the 
unquestioned prerequisite for the long-term success of the Four Modernizations,
^Frederick M. Surls and Francis C. Tuan, “China’s Agriculture in the 1980’s,” in China under 
the Four Modernizations, Joint Economic Committee (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print­
ing Office, 1982), 422; Lu Baifu, “The Way for Agriculture,” Beijing Review, 1983, no, 4 (Jan. 
24): li; Xinhua, Jan. 11, 1983, in FBIS, Jan. 13, 1983, K14—15.
TABLE 10.1 Rates of Birth, Mortality, and Natural 
Increase in Population Growth for the People s Republic 
of China, 1949-1983 (per 1,000 population)
Birth rate Mortality rate Natural increase in population
1949 36.00 20.00 16.00
1950 37.00 18.00 19.00
1951 37.80 17.80 20.00
1952 37.00 17.00 20.00
1953 37.00 14.00 23.00
1954 37.97 13.18 24.79
1955 32.60 12.28 20.32
1956 31.90 11.40 20.50
1957 34.03 10.80 23.23
1958 29.22 11.98 17.24
1959 24.78 14.59 10.19
1960 20.86 25.43 -4.57
1961 18.02 14.24 3.78
1962 37.01 10.02 26.99
1963 43.37 10.04 33.33
1964 39.14 11.50 27.64
1965 37.88 9.50 28.38
1966 35.05 8.83 26.22
1967 33.96 8.43 25.53
1968 35.59 8.21 27.38
1969 34.11 8.03 26.08
1970 33.43 7.60 25.83
1971 30.65 7.32 23.33
1972 29.77 7.61 22.16
1973 27.93 7.04 20.89
1974 24.82 7.34 17.48
1975 23.01 7.32 15.69
1976 19.91 7.25 12.66
1977 18.93 6.87 12.06
1978 18.25 6.25 12.00
1979 17.82 6.21 11.61
1980 — — 12.00
1981 20.91 6.36 14.55
1982 21.09 6.60 14.49
1983 18.62 7.08 11.54
sources;
For all years except 1980 and 1983, Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian, 1983 (China Statistical Yearbook) 
(Beijing: State Statistical Bureau, 1983), 105. For 1980, see State Statistical Bureau, “Communique 
on Fulfilment of China’s National Economic Plan,” Beijing Review, 1981, no. 20 (May 18): 20. For 
1983, see 1984 Zhongguo Jingji Nianjian (1984 Economic Yearbook of China) (Beijing: Economic 
Management Publishers, 1984), IV-60.
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even among those who were concerned over the severity of the one child 
policy. As important as this goal was, however, the short-term goal of trans­
forming rural economic structures was of much higher priority. Because 
the agrarian reform program represented not just a policy debate but also the 
focus of elite struggle, it was on this issue that political resources were mobi­
lized and expended. Taking their cues from the Center, provincial and local 
Party leaders left family-planning work, as much as possible, to female com­
rades, who had always been responsible for this aspect of “women’s work,” 
while they concentrated their attention on a rapidly changing rural environ­
ment. Only after the Open Letter signaled the importance attached to family 
planning by central Party leaders did local cadres reassess the priority of this 
work.
By that time, however, a second dilemma had become apparent; the eco­
nomic and organizational consequences of agricultural reforms were det­
rimental to the conduct of a strict policy of population control. This regula­
tory policy, stressing controlled uniformity in childbearing behavior, stood in 
sharp contrast to the general thrust of rural economic and administrative 
reforms. In those areas the watchwords were decentralization of decision 
making, reduction of administrative oversight, and economic diversification 
of households, groups, and teams based on local conditions. This dramatic 
dismantling of the collective system of agriculture was viewed as either desir­
able or threatening, depending on individual political and economic in­
terests. Thus, at precisely the time when a demographic crisis loomed, dereg- 
ulatory policies were under way which had polarized rural communities. 
Advocates and opponents of rural reform coalesced in their opposition to 
family planning, however, with pro-reform elements blaming “leftists” for 
the one-child policy, and opponents blaming the “rightists” and their neo- 
Malthusian population theories for the draconian policy.
It was against this backdrop that central policy makers groped for a 
strategy to deal with a changing rural context and local opposition or indif­
ference. The result was a strategy of regularized, decentralized administra­
tion punctuated by periods of mobilization and the veiled use of economic 
and sometimes physical coercion. It was augmented by the use of economic 
incentives to gain compliance, a preferred policy technique of the post-Mao 
reformist leadership.
This chapter will examine the difficult task faced by China’s leadership in 
its attempts to dictate household size in the rural areas. Drawing on archival 
materials and data from extended field research in Hubei province,I will
‘ Interviews cited below were conducted in three phases in 1982 and 1984. From March 
through May 1982, fieldwork was conducted with Professor Chen Chung-min of Ohio State 
University’s Department of Anthropology. The interview schedule was jointly developed to 
meet the needs of our separate research projects, and Chen conducted the interviews in the field. 
I wish to express my deep appreciation to Dr. Chen, whose willingness to collaborate and
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demonstrate that four sets of factors loom large in accounting for problems of 
implementation: traditional attitudes and values, the decentralized regula­
tory process, administrative arrangements and the delivery system for 
family-planning services, and the environment of rural reform m which 
population policy is being enforced.
Taken together, these factors pose a number of important obstacles to 
policy implementation. Binding them together is the common theme of low 
levels of compliance on the part of peasants and cadres in some localities. 
Although many measures have been put forward by the state to redress prob­
lems in the implementation process, they have fallen short of their goal be­
cause they fail to solve this central difficulty.
IMPLEMENTING CHINA’S POPULATION PROGRAM: IMPEDIMENTS
The Impact of Traditional Values on Rural Childbearing Preferences 
Since implementing the one-child-per-couple program, a campaign has been 
waged against what is termed “the resurgence of feudal ideas” in the 
countryside.5 jhese “feudal ideas” come in the form of age-old sayings, such 
as “the more children, the more wealth,” “regarding men as superior to 
women,” “raise sons to protect against old age,” and “carry on the ancestral 
line.” That these ideas remain in contemporary China is indicative of the 
dfficulty of altering the traditional values and preferences of a rural popu­
lace. More important, it is also indicative of the failure of the regime to alter 
sufficiently the economic environment that fosters them.
A 1981 survey of fifteen production brigades in five counties of Hubei 
province confirms the importance of traditional values and economic consid­
erations in shaping preferences for household size.® Of 728 women of child­
bearing age (20-49) surveyed, only 5% wanted only one child, 51% wanted 
two children, 28% wanted three, and 15% wanted four. In what the author
share his field notes, intellectual insights, and interview techniques worked to my great advan­
tage. During phase two, October-December 1982, the author continued fieldwork independent­
ly, conducting interviews at Hua Shan commune and with district family-planning officials. The 
opportunity for research was provided by Ohio State University through the OSU-Wuhan Uni­
versity Exchange Program. A third phase of fieldwork and interviewing in the spring of 1984 was 
undertaken as a Graduate Fellow in the National Program for Advanced Study and Research m 
China, administered by the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People s Republic 
of China, National Academy of Sciences.
^Renmin Ribao editorial, “Give First Priority to Propaganda and Education in the Work oi 
Family Planning,” Sept. 29, 1981, 1; Xinhua, Jan. 10, 1983, in FB/5, Jan. 13, 1983, K15; Guang- 
ming Ribao, Jan. 12, 1983, in FBIS, Jan. 19, 1983, K22; Xinhua Commentator, Jan. 19, 1983, m
FB/5,Jan. 25, 1983, K21. m .n- u
•iCheng Du, “Hubei Sheng Nongcun Shengyu Lu Diaocha” (An Investigation of Rural Birth
Rates in Hubei Province), Renkou Yanjiu (Population Research), 1982, no. 5: 36-38 and 31.
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refers to as “hilly districts where traditional ideology is comparatively 
dense,” however, the numbers climb to 27% wanting two or three children, 
and nearly 72% wanting four. Asked which sex child they prefer, a sample of 
100 women in one brigade responded as follows: only 2.2% wanted a girl, 
36.7% wanted a boy, and 61.6% were neutral.^ In hilly districts, however, 
the number desiring a male soared to 77%. Asked what they would do if the 
first child was a girl, 61% said they would want another child. In a separate 
article based on the same survey, fully one-third of 710 women said they 
wanted to have a boy even if they already had two girls. Only 2.21% of a 
sample of 548 said they wanted to have only one girl.®
The study concludes that the desire for more children is caused by factors 
such as the “social economy,” “ideology,” and “traditional habits.” More 
specifically, 808 people who were asked why they wanted additional children 
responded as follows: additional labor power, 21%; old-age security, 51%; 
preserve the ancestral line, 25%; enjoy the pleasure of children, 3%. The 
problem of old-age security clearly predominates. This category, taken 
together with those who cited the desire for additional labor power, drew 
70% of all responses, demonstrating the role of economic calculations in 
determining preferences for household size.®
The influence of the desire to bear more children, particularly sons, is 
further evidenced by figures on holders of “only-child certificates” and ster­
ilizations in Hua Shan commune, located in a suburban district of Wuhan 
municipality, Hubei province. In October 1982 there were 999 couples with 
only one child. Of these only 42 (4%) had undergone sterilization, and of the 
42, only 7 (17%) had girls; 876 had signed “only-child certificates,” pledging 
not to have another child.*® This certificate rate of 91%, far above the 
estimated national average of 42%,** was achieved by offering short-term, 
five-year contracts to couples reluctant to sign a permanent agreement. In 
this way, Hua Shan family-planning workers were able to persuade parents 
of males and females to sign an agreement, and thus forestall unplanned 
pregnancies over the short term. It was hoped that after the five-year period, 
couples with healthy children of either sex would no longer be inclined to 
have another child.
In one brigade, of 123 single-child couples, 59 (48%) signed the “only-
’Cheng’s article does not make clear that the size of the sample here is only 100 women, not 
728. This information was obtained from personal conversations with another scholar who par­
ticipated in the investigation. Interview File 2, Nov. 25, 1983.
®Cheng Du, “Nongcun Renkoude Zaishengchan—Dui Yige Diaocha Baogaode Fenxi” (The 
Reproduction of Rural Population—Toward the Analysis of an Investigation Keport), Jingji 
Yanjiu (Economic Research), 1982, no. 6:56.
®Cheng Du, 31.
■“Interview File (hereafter IF) lB-7, 9 (82.10.14).
''Renmin Ribao, Apr. 10, 1983, 3.
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child certificate,” 54 (44%) signed a five-year agreement, and 10 (8%) re­
fused to sign altogether. In a second brigade, only the five-year agreement 
was in force; 54 of 111 couples (49%) signed and received the “special sta­
tus” rewards for their child. The other 57 apparently were reluctant to sign, 
and eventually agreed only to get a birth certificate for the child; thus, this 
group did not get the “special status” rewards. In a third brigade, of the 53 
couples with one child, 4 (7%) underwent sterilization procedures after hav­
ing males, 7 (13%) signed long-term certificates (only 2 of these had girls), 
and 25 (47%) signed a short-term contract (17 had girls). Of the remaining 
17 who did not fall in any of these categories, it was said that “most of them 
have girls.” And in a fourth brigade, all 41 single-child couples had either 
signed a five-year contract or had an operation, but only 5 of these couples 
had girls (12%).'^ According to a commune family-planning cadre, all 81 
couples in Hua Shan who had refused to sign an “only-child certificate” have 
female children.*^ In short, reluctance to accept having only one child is not 
confined to those with one daughter, but parents of females are less inclined 
than parents of males to formally agree to limit themselves to one child.
Is the desire for more children, and particularly more male children, the 
product of old ideas or of contemporary economic realities? We already have 
seen survey evidence demonstrating the importance of economic factors in 
setting preferences for household size. Although the utility of these survey 
results admittedly is quite limited, they do suggest that concern for old-age 
security is the single most important factor motivating the desire for addi­
tional children, particularly males. This reflects a contemporary economic 
and social reality: the absence of a universal or even widespread system of 
support for the elderly across the countryside.
In 1980 there were 8,262 “homes of respect for the aged,” serving 111,700 
people in rural China. Additionally, 4,000 basic accounting units provided 
old-age pensions for more than 180,000 people.In 1981, 282 more retire­
ment homes were established, an increase of only 3% over 1980. Assuming 
that 5% of the rural population is eligible for such retirement support, these 
programs cover only about 1% of those eligible.
Of the twelve communes in Hong Shan district, where Hua Shan com­
mune is located, in 1982 only one had a retirement home run by the com­
mune. Although the per capita income level of this commune is unknown, 
one of its brigades had the single highest per capita collective distributable 
income of all brigades in Hong Shan district or the two surburban counties
‘2IF lD-9, 10 (82.5.16); IF lE-11 (82.5.23); IF lJ-9, 10 (82.11.9); IF lG-10 (82.10.28).
>HF lB-7 (82.10.14).
'*Zhongguo Baike Nianjian, 1981 (Encyclopedia of China) (Beijing: Zhongguo Dabaike Quan- 
shu Chubanshe, 1981), 545.
'^Zhongguo Baike Nianjian, 1982 (Beijing: Zhongguo Dabaike Quanshu Chubanshe, 1982), 
646.
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TABLE 10.2 Comparing Mean Statistics for Xiu Hui 
Commune, Zhang Qiu County, Shandong, with Mean 
Statistics for Only-Child Households
Commune Only-Child Households
No. people per household 4.25 4.39
Labor power per household 1.65 2.37
No. persons supported by each laborer 2.57 1.85
1981 collective per capita income (yuan)
1981 per capita income from family side-
123.00
lines (yuan) 30.00
Total per capita income (yuan)
Percentage of total households with per
153.00 240.40
capita income over 500 yuan 1.60 3.80
source: Zhang Xinxia, “Du Sheng Zi Nu Hu ye you Tiaojian Fufuqilai” (Single-Child Households Also 
Have the Conditions for Becoming Rich), Renkou Yanjiu (Population Research), 1982, no. 5: 32-33.
of Wuhan municipality—817 yuan in 1981.*® In six other communes, some 
brigades offered retirement incomes. In the five remaining communes in the 
district, retirement support from the collective was not offered. Hua Shan, 
with its 1981 per capita income of 209 yuan, more than double the provincial 
average, was among the latter group. *^
Besides old-age insurance, the need for household labor power is another 
motivating factor for larger households. To counter the idea that wealth and 
security are strongly associated with household size, several studies have 
appeared in Chinese journals. Their authors argue that one-child families 
have higher per capita incomes from collective distribution than multi-child 
families. A close look at one study, however, reveals that such conclusions 
have more to do with household size and labor power than with whether it is 
a one-child household.*®
A study of Xiu Hui commune in Shandong province compares mean com­
mune statistics on household size, labor power, and income with mean 
figures for only-child households (see table 10.2). Here, one-child households 
clearly have higher per eapita incomes; but to what is that attributable- 
childbearing restraint or total household size and labor power? In this case, 
single-child households are on average slightly larger than the commune
'^Changjiang Ribao, Mar, 19, 1982. IF lK-7 (82.12.1).
■^IF lK-7 (82.12.1). Hubei province’s 1981 average income from the collective for commune 
members was 102 yuan. See 1982 Nian Zhongguo Jingji Nianjian (1982 Economic Yearbook of 
China) (Beijing: Jingji Guanli Zazhi She, 1982), VI-123.
*®Zhang Xinxia, “Du Sheng Zinu Hu ye you Tiaojian Fufuqilai” (Single-Child Households 
Also Have the Conditions for Becoming Rich), Renkou Yanjiu, 1982, no. 5: 32-33 and 43.
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average, despite having a single-ehild couple in the household. More impor­
tant, average household labor power is also higher. We can conclude only 
that there is a relationship between labor power and income, since average 
labor power for the commune is 69 percent of that for single-child house­
holds, and income is 65 percent. Thus, a study that seeks to argue for t e 
economic advantages of having only one child actually substantiates peasant 
assumptions that over the long term, more children are desirable because 
they bring more labor power to the household.
Not only do peasants remain unconvinced that smaller households gener­
ate higher incomes, they also question the argument that females are as eco­
nomically desirable as males, and for good reason. Traditionally, daughters 
contributed little or nothing to the family coffers and left the household upon 
marriage. While they make a substantial contribution m contemporary 
China, that contribution still shifts to their husband’s household at marriage. 
Moreover, rural wage-earning policies discriminate against women. Where 
the work-point system remains in force, women typically receive only 70 to 
80 percent of what their male counterparts earn.'^ Where land has been 
contracted to the household, allotments are based on the number of people m 
the household.20 Although this eliminates inequalities in the short term, over 
the longer term single women will leave the household, whereas men will 
bring a wife into it. Thus, the land distribution formula now in effect under 
the agricultural responsibility system reinforces traditional attitudes and 
behavior toward women.
Moreover, in some cases the land-allotment process itself discriminates 
against women by linking the size of an individual’s allotoent to his or her 
previous work-point standard. An example of one team m Hua Shan com­
mune demonstrates the full implications of this distribution system for 
peasant incomes. When one of Hua Shan’s brigades implemented the 
household-contract responsibility system in 1982, team five had 169 mu ot 
land to distribute among 42 households, 163 people. The land was divided 
into three grades, each grade having a different quota attached; for grade 1, 
1,100 jin of rice per mu (1 jin equals V2 kilogram); for grade 2, 1,000 jin per 
mu; for grade 3, 900 jin per mu. Of team five’s land, 66 percent was grade 1,
>9Hong Ying, “Women in China Making Headway to Full Equality,” China Daily, Mar. 6, 
1982 5 in FBIS Mar. 8, 1982, K.15; Wu Naitao, “Rural Women and the New Economic 
Policies’,” Beijing Review, 1983, no. 10 (Mar. 7): 19. In Hua Shan the same pattern prevailed. IF 
56-13(82.10.14).
20Zhang Huaiyu, “Lun Renkou yu JingjiJianji Dangqian Nongcun Renkou Kongzhi Wenti 
(A Discussion of Population and Economics Concurrently as the Current Problem of Rural 
Population ConlToX), Jingji Yanjiu, 1981, no. 12: 37; Liu Honglian, “Kongzhi Wo Guo Renkou 
Zengzhang buneng Fangsong” (Do Not Relax Control of Our Country’s Population Increase) 
Sichuan Caijing Xueyuan Xuebao, 1982, no. 2:5; Xu Xuehan, “Resolutely Implement the Policy of 
Rural Population,” Renmin Ribao, Feb. 5, 1982, 5.
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TABLE 10.3 Differential Land Allotments for 
Hypothetical Households in One Team of Hua Shan 
Commune, Wuhan, Hubei
“Grain-quota land” “Labor land” Totals
Case 1. Family of 4:
3 males @ 10 work .311 mu X 4 = (3.36 X 3) -h
points (father, 2 sons);
1 female @ 8 work 1.244 mu
2.69 = 
12.77 mu 14.014
points (mother)
Case 2. Family of 4:
2 males @ 10 work .311 mu X 4 = (3.36 X 2) -1-
points (father and son);
2 females @ 8 work 1.244 mu
(2.69 X 2) = 
12.1 mu 13.344
points (mother and 
daughter)
Case 3. Family of 4:
1 male @ 10 work .311 mu X 4 = 3.36 -h
points (father);
3 females @ 8 work 1.244 mu
(2.69 X 3) =
11.43 mu 12.674
points (mother, two 
daughters)
23 percent grade two, and 11 percent grade 3. In dividing the land, each 
household was to receive proportionate amounts of each grade of land.2'
Step one was to distribute one-third of the average land per capita to each 
person as “grain-ration land” {kouliang tian) to provide for each person’s diet. 
In team five the amount was .311 mu per capita. No distinctions were made 
based on age, sex, or physical condition. Step two was to distribute “labor 
land” {laoli tian) based on the laborer’s previous work-point standard. In 
team five the standard varied from 10 to 8.5 for men, and 8.5 to 7 for women. 
Those who had earned 10 work points a day got 3.36 mu, 9 points got 3 mu, 
and 8 points got 2.69 mu. Thus, table 10.3 shows the total land area to be 
allotted assuming (1) different household compositions, and (2) consistent 
work-point standards of 10 for men and 8 for women. As can be seen, a 
household with two healthy sons would get .67 mu more than if they had two 
daughters.
How does this difference in land allotment translate into collective income 
for the household? In team five 25.3 percent of each household’s total rice 
quota had to be sold to the state at the price of 12 yuan per 100 jin. Another 
1.3 percent was to be turned over to the team without compensation. After
2>IF 2G-6-9 (82.11.4).
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harvest each household was responsible for paying the agricultural tax of 4 
yuan per mu of contracted land and for contributing 3 yuan per mu to the 
team welfare fund. Finally, brigade cadres estimated that average grain con­
sumption was 600 jin per capita, and that household expenses toward agri­
cultural production averaged 15 yuan per mu of contracted land.^^ If we 
assume that actual yields are equal to quota levels, that investment and con­
sumption levels are the same for each household, and that all excess produc­
tion is sold to the state at its above-quota price of 18 yuan per 100 jin, it is 
possible to calculate household and per capita incomes from rice production 
alone, assuming different household compositions. The following list gives 
estimated income from rice production for three hypothetical households in a 
team in Hua Shan.
Per Capita 
Income
Household Income Household Income 
as a Percentage of Case 1
Case 1. 415.34 1,661.34 100
Case 2. 390.26 1,561.04 94
Case 3. 365.26 1,461.03 88
We find a spread of 50 yuan in per capita income between families with two 
sons and families with two daughters, 25 yuan between families with two 
sons and those with one son and one daughter. For household income, the 
spread is 200 and 100 yuan respectively. The household income of cases 2 
and 3 is shown as a percentage of case 1. The spread of 6% and 12% respec­
tively is slightly wider than under the old system where, assuming that the 
same number of full labor days is worked by all, families with one daughter 
and one son would have earned 96% of the income of two-son families, and 
two-daughter families would have earned 90% of two-son family incomes.
Thus, while the contract system has tended to boost peasant incomes 
overall, it has enhanced the economic value of male offspring relative to female. 
Moreover, as per-unit yields go up, the value of each additional increment of 
land increases. In our example, we assumed only that the quota levels for 
yield per mu were met, whereas the 1981 brigade average yield was 25% 
higher than the team-five quotas.If 25% higher production levels were 
used to calculate incomes, the difference of .67 mu between male and female 
allotments would translate into even wider discrepancies in household 
income.
The combined weight of traditional values and economic realities, then, is 
creating strong pressures for more offspring, and especially for more sons. 
The consequence has been a substantial number of “illicit” births, that is,
22 Ibid.
2^Brigade rice production in 1981 was 2,810,000 jin. Rice acreage was 2021 mu. Average 
yield per mu equals 1,390 jin. IF 3G-2-3 (82.11.2).
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births outside the plan, and an upsurge in reported cases of abuse of women 
who give birth to females and of female infanticide.2^
Underscoring its concern over this phenomenon, Renmin Ribao, in April 
1983, published birth statistics collected in two counties in Anhui province, 
which demonstrated a strong bias toward male births. Statistics for four com­
munes in Huaiyuan county show the number of male births as a percentage 
of the total, ranging from 57.5 to 62.4. In three brigades, the discrepancy 
between males and females is even higher, with males constituting 77.8 to 
90% of all births. Although these figures conceivably could be the result of a 
naturally occurring pattern of births, two additional cases suggest that it is 
not. The report notes that one team in the same county had forty cases of 
female infanticide in 1980 and 1981. In the first three months of 1981, one 
brigade recorded eight births—three healthy boys and five girls. According to 
the report, of the five girls three were drowned and two were abandoned.25 
Although the number of reported cases of this kind has been small, many 
more probably go undetected, particularly cases of infant death through 
neglect or abandonment. The Chinese press has been vocal in denouncing 
such behavior, but the phenomenon continues.
The Decentralized Regulatory Process
China’s experience with population control is a monumental confirmation 
of the dilemmas posed by geographic and organizational dispersion in the 
implementation process.26 Though based on a centrally directed goal, 
the implementation of the one-child-per-couple population program is de­
centralized in two ways: First, it is left to the localities to generate family­
planning regulations consistent with central directives and local conditions; 
second, it is up to the localities to establish and maintain the organizational 
structure charged with implementing the policy.
China’s central directives on family planning instruct cadres to promote 
only one child per couple, strictly limit second births, eliminate the occur­
rence of third births, and stress the need for late marriages and late 
childbirth.2^ To enforce the policy, subordinates are further instructed to 
establish a system of rewards and penalties designed to encourage com­
pliance. The September 1980 “Open Letter” to all Party and Youth League
Renmin Ribao, Mar. 7, 1983, 1; Guangming Ribao, ]a.n. 12, 1983, 1, in Jan. 19, 1983, 
K22; Yang Fan, “Save the Baby Girl,” in Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, Nov. 9, 1982, 3, in FBIS, Dec. 
7, 1982, K55-56; “Protecting Infant Girls,” Beijing Review, 1983, no. 5 (Jan. 31): 4; Renmin Ribao 
Apr. 7, 1983, 4.
Renmin Ribao, Apr. 7, 1983, 4.
26Qn this generic implementation problem, see, for example, Merilee S. Grindle, “Policy 
Content and Context in Implementation,” in Grindle, ed.. Politics and Policy implementation in the 
Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 10.
^’ Renmin Ribao editorial, “Firmly Adhere to the Scientific and Correct Population Policy,” 
Mar. 14, 1982; Xinhua, Mar. 13, 1982, in FBIS, Mar. 15, 1982, K4-6.
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members outlined several “special considerations” for only-child families: 
free nursery and school enrollment, medical care, preference m job allocation 
for the child when it matures, extra housing space for urbanites, and in the 
rural areas, extra portions of private plot and preference in the allocation of 
land on which to build houses.28 Penalties for noncomphance, however, are 
advocated but not specified, leaving it to the provinces and localities to 
generate appropriate regulations.
The result of this decentralized approach to family-planning regulations 
has been some divergence across localities with respect to the provisions in 
force. In implementing Shaanxi’s family-planning regulations, for example, 
Vice-Governor Tan Weixu stated that the provincial levy for having an un­
planned second child, “10 percent of the standard wages or labor income o 
both husband and wife,” conformed with “the standard implemented by all 
provinces and municipalities.” Looking at regulations for Tianjin, Shanghai, 
Shenyang, and Guizhou, as well as Shaanxi, we see that the 10 percent levy is 
indeed the common penalty. What varies is the length of time the penalty 
remains in force. Whereas couples in Tianjin with an unplanned second child 
would pay the levy for five years, Shanghai violators would pay for only three 
years. In Shenyang, however, the same couple would have their income 
docked for fourteen years.^^ In Hua Shan, commune cadres said the penalty 
was to apply for seven years, in accordance with regulations set by higher
authorities.”^® ... .
Divergence in the regulations does not end at the provincial and munici­
pal levels. Lower-level administrative units are responsible for drafting their 
own regulations. In Tianjin, for example, the family-planning decision ol 
Tune 1 1981, states: “In view of the great differences in economic conditions 
existing in our rural counties, every rural County People’s Government may 
formulate its own stipulations concerning the length and amount of levies m 
accordance with local conditions and should report its stipulations to the 
municipal family planning office for the record.”^' This provision grants the 
five counties under municipal jurisdiction a great deal of autonomy in gener­
ating specific regulations governing sanctions for unplanned births.
Why allow local autonomy in the enactment of family-planning regula­
tions? Local generation of rules is preferable, it is argued, in order to take into 
account different economic levels, different types of agricultural arrange­
ments, and different demographic characteristics across localities. Ihis
Sept. 25, 1980, in FB/5, Sept. 26. 1980, Ll-4.
2BTianjin City Service, Apr. 29, 1981, in FBIS, May 8. 1981, R2-i-,MangR^bao Aug. 10, 
1981 3, in FBIS, Sept. 2, 1981, 03-6; Shenyang Liaoning Provincial Service, Oct. 25 1981, in 
FBli Oct. 28, 1981, S2-3; Guiyang, Guizhou Provincial Service, Nov. 13 1981 _°'''
23, 1981, Ql-2; Xian, Shaanxi Provincial Service, May 3, 1981, in FBIS, May 4, 1981, 2 .
30IF lB-11 (82.10.14).
3>Tianjin Gity Service, in FBIS, May 8, 1981, R3.
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rationale for the voluntary delegation of authority to lower levels, however, 
masks the structural dilemma-—the limited ability of higher levels to compel 
local administrators to adopt the regulations drafted above, a modified ver­
sion of them, or any at all. The problem becomes increasingly acute toward 
the bottom of the administrative system (brigades and teams), for it is there 
that the rules must finally be enforced, and it is there that the costs of 
enforcement—material, political, and manpower costs—must be borne.
At the grass roots, teams and brigades must find the funds to provide paid 
pregnancy leave and “preferential treatments” for single-child households, 
pay cash bonuses to those who agree to undergo sterilization after having one 
child, and provide land for those who want to build homes. In addition, they 
must devise a mechanism to extract penalties from policy offenders, not just 
once, but for three, five, seven, or fourteen years. The source of funds to 
reward those who comply with the one-child policy is typically the collective 
welfare fund, which has been taxed by the new burden placed on it. In some 
places it has proved inadequate to meet the demands for rewards; thus, 
promised rewards never materialize.Implementation of the responsibility 
system has exacerbated this problem, as well as the problem of enforcing 
penalties. In Guizhou “the necessity to make rewards and penalties stick” 
was termed by the vice-governor in November 1981 the “current main prob­
lem” in family-planning work.^s Similarly, Jiangsu deputies to the Fourth 
Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress noted that some rural areas 
“can neither afford to give awards nor do anything as a penalty.
In short, because family-planning regulations are enforced through local 
funding with local personnel, higher levels cannot force them to be adopted, 
or if adopted, to be carried out. In Hua Shan commune, for example, there 
was resistance to the enforcement of economic penalties for those who had 
violated the birth plan. Only three of six brigades for which information is 
available had penalties in force in 1982, despite a January 1982 commune 
meeting encouraging the adoption of stiffer sanctions. Among the three, only 
one enforced the so-called standard penalty of a 10 percent deduction from 
the offending couple’s combined income for seven years. The two other bri­
gades both opted for a flat fee of 200 yuan for a second birth, and one brigade 
raised the levy to 300 yuan in the event of a third birth. Where such “flat fee” 
sanctions are enforced, peasants with rising incomes may increasingly come 
to view this payment as a good investment for long-term household security.
Zhang Yongchen, CaoJingchun, “Shengchan Zerenzhi yu Kongzhi Nongcun Renkou Zeng- 
zhang” (The Production Responsibility System and the Control of Rural Population Increase), 
Renkou yu Jingji (Population and Economics), 1982, no. 1: 13; Zhu Mian, “Nongye Shengchan 
Zerenzhi yu Nongcunde Jihua Shengyu Gongzuo” (The Agricultural Production Responsibility 
System and Rural Planned Birth Work), Renkou Yanjiu, 1982, no. 5:27.
^^Guizhou Provincial Service, Nov. 13, 1981, in FBIS, Nov. 23, 1981, Ql.
Xinhua, Dec. 8, 1981, in FBIS, Dec. 10, 1981, Kl.
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In Hua Shan a brigade women’s leader noted that one woman pregnant 
outside the plan had resisted all efforts at persuasion and threats of a 200 
yuan fine by saying that even if she had to pay 500 yuan, she would still 
have the child.
When asked about the variable enforcement of economic sanctions, the 
commune family-planning cadre conceded that brigades could not be made 
to enforce the regulations advocated by the commune.^6 The importance of 
such sanctions is demonstrated by figures on third births in Hua Shan. Of 
the five cases of third births which were admitted to have occurred in 1981 
and 1982, four were born in brigades that had no penalty in force.
The problems faced by county and commune-level cadres trying to en­
force economic sanctions at the local level have been exacerbated by the 
enactment of structural reforms in the countryside. With the decision to 
slowly shift political and administrative responsibilities away from the com­
mune to newly established xiang governments, the position of commune 
cadres was called into question and their authority was diminished, in anti­
cipation of the impending structural change, which was scheduled to be 
completed by the end of 1984.^’ Moreover, in areas where communes were 
divided into multiple townships, new cadres had to be recruited to carry on 
all aspects of township work, including family planning. In one Hubei county, 
however, no county funds were available to pay the salaries of additional 
family-planning cadres, and the township refused to use collective funds for 
this purpose. As a result, thirty-one of the fifty-five townships established in 
early 1984 were still without family-planning cadres six months later.
Thus, commune structural reforms—taken together with the effects of (1) 
calls for increased exercise of brigade and production team autonomy, (2) a 
reduction of the number of local-level cadres drawing collective support, and 
(3) a decrease in the amount of time cadres are willing to spend away from 
their “responsibility fields” {zeren Han) fulfilling administrative duties—are 
changing the political landscape in the countryside. With the influence of 
commune-level cadres on the wane, and the formal administrative structure 
in flux, brigades and teams are becoming increasingly important decisional 
units in the policy process, particularly when they retain substantial 
administrative autonomy, as in the case of population policy.
Administrative Structure and the Delivery System for Family-Planning Services 
In 1973, Offices for Planned Birth were established at the state, provincial, 
municipal, and county levels. These offices were charged with overseeing the 
implementation of population policy, the focus of which was voluntary adop-
35IF lC-4 (82.4.6); lD-8 (82.5.16); lF-13 (82.10.12); lH-15 (82.11.4); IF lJ-10 (82.11.9).
36IF lB-11 (82.10.14).
Renmin Ribao, Nov. 23, 1983, 1.
Interview File No. 17 (84.6.9), 4.
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tion of birth control measures and reduction of family size. In the 1970s this 
administrative system, combined with a rural delivery system for contracep­
tive services and supplies, was effective in helping to bring down birthrates.
The system that was adequate for a voluntary family-planning program, 
however, has been strained by the increasing pressures to limit family size 
and meet birth quotas. Organizational weaknesses that could be tolerated 
under a voluntary program have posed severe impediments to implementa­
tion of the mandatory one-child-per-couple program. Moreover, new respon­
sibilities have been placed on the administrative and technical cadres, 
making coordination of activity and high quality performance increasingly 
difficult at the grass-roots level.
Before discussing the weaknesses in this system, let us first examine more 
closely one example of how the system works. Hua Shan commune, in early 
1982, had a population of approximately 30,600, with 7,100 households and 
4,344 couples of childbearing age. Only two individuals at this level are 
directly involved in daily administration of family planning: the head of the 
Women’s Federation branch, and a staff worker (ganshi) in charge of family 
planning, both of whom began their jobs in January 1981. Before that time 
the staff position did not exist.
In addition to these cadres who directly administer population policy, the 
commune director and Party secretary also play a role. These leaders, parti­
cularly the local Party secretary, have broad oversight duties in all policy 
areas; population policy is no exception. Besides being accountable for the 
results of population-control efforts in the commune, they play an active role 
by attending meetings on family-planning work. Additionally, they allocate 
and manage locally generated funds targeted for population work.
Above the commune level is the Hong Shan District Office for Family 
Planning, the lowest-level office in the formal family-planning structure origi­
nating in Beijing. Before the creation of this office in 1979, the district govern­
ment, the health bureau, and the office for women and children all jointly 
managed family-planning work. The district office has only 6 people to over­
see an area with a population of 364,200, including more than 63,400 women 
of childbearing age (20—49 years). The staff positions include a director, a 
vice-director, staff workers for propaganda and professional work, and two 
staffers handling routine business. The office coordinates laterally with dis­
trict government and Party officials and reports vertically to the Wuhan 
Municipal Family Planning Office.
Below the commune level are brigade and team cadres. In Hua Shan 
brigade administrative committees generally consist of a director, three 
deputies, and one to four additional committee members. All brigade leaders
39IF lA-7 (82.4.6).
“IF lK-1 (82.12.1).
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were male, as were the majority of deputies and committee members. 
However, each brigade committee has one deputy in charge of “women’s 
work” {funu gongzuo) called the “brigade women’s leader,” as is customary. It 
is this group of women who do the bulk of the daily work in implementing 
population policy. In Hua Shan they average thirty-eight years of age, have a 
middle-school level of education, and have been on the job six years. The 
majority served as team women’s leaders before being promoted to the 
brigade level.
Besides the brigade women’s leaders, brigade directors and branch Party 
secretaries, like their commune-level counterparts, attend meetings, submit 
reports, and assume general responsibility for fulfilling local population 
plans. Unlike their superiors, however, they sometimes become more actively 
involved in policy enforcement, as when they are called on to accompany 
brigade women’s leaders to the homes of recalcitrant couples who do not 
wish to comply with the birth plan. These cadres also exercise substantial 
autonomy in the adoption and enforcement of family-planning regulations, 
and are accountable for brigade performance.
Finally, team-level cadres sit at the bottom of the family-planning admin­
istrative structure. Production teams in Hua Shan generally have three 
administrative cadres, one of whom is the team women’s leader. On average, 
team women’s leaders are slightly younger and slightly less well educated 
and have been in their jobs longer than brigade women’s leaders.'*2 They are 
responsible for enforcing the team plan in their own villages, among friends 
and neighbors with whom they work and live, and for coordinating activity 
with the brigade women’s leader. The team leader plays a role similar to 
brigade cadres, with one major exception. He does not set the family­
planning rules, as brigade cadres do. He does, however, retain substantial 
influence on the enforcement of them.
Another group of actors involved with population policy are the technical 
cadres at the commune and brigade levels. In 1982 there were fifty-four bare­
foot doctors spread among two commune clinics and brigade health stations. 
Of these, twenty-three had passed qualifying exams to achieve the rank of 
“country doctor.” These individuals, in addition to providing medical ser­
vices, train brigade and team women’s leaders in the use of various birth 
control devices and offer technical guidance. It is still the women’s leaders, 
however, who actually carry out the routine work of supplying contraceptives 
and monitoring pregnancies. Commune clinic personnel are responsible only 
for these technical medical services: (1) providing guidance as to the most 
appropriate form of birth control for those with special health considerations;
These mean characteristics are based on information for all nineteen brigade women’s 
leaders. IF 3A-1-8 (82.4.13).
‘‘^These mean characteristics are derived from information on team women’s leaders in four 
brigades. IF 3B-14 (82.3.30); IF lE-6 (82.5.23); IF 3C-7-9 (82.10.26); IF 3D-2-4 (82.11.4).
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(2) performing contraceptive procedures; and (3) conducting semiannual 
check-ups for wearers of intrauterine devices.
How do these personnel coordinate the implementation of population 
policy? The first task of family-planning cadres is to designate birth quotas. 
National birthrate targets are set annually by the state, which sets the stan­
dard for each province. Once provincial targets are set, lower administrative 
levels must establish quotas in line with these targets. In Hong Shan district 
the target is set by government and Party cadres, the district Women’s 
Federation Head, and family-planning-office personnel. According to a 
district-level family-planning cadre, rather than utilizing a formula based 
solely on territorial population, such specific factors as the number of cou­
ples newly married but childless and the projected number of newlyweds 
are also considered when local targets are set. Ultimately, however, any 
specific calculations of this kind must be reduced to a set number of births 
per 1,000 population. In the case of Hua Shan, the 1982 birth quota was 
13.5 per 1,000.*4
At the brigade level, cadres translate the 13.5 per 1,000 formula into an 
actual allotment of births for the year. A brigade of 2,000, for example, would 
plan for 27 births in 1982. In five brigades for which such information is 
available, three brigade women’s leaders further divide the quota to indi­
vidual teams, while two do not. One cadre noted that rather than subdivide 
the brigade allotment to the team, she maintained a “unified brigade plan” 
for births. Because couples usually had a child soon after marriage, she went 
on, it was better to remain flexible throughout the brigade and allocate birth 
permits to newlyweds, no matter which team they were from.'*'^
In addition to setting birth quotas, brigade cadres also issue birth permits. 
These permits are the sanction of legitimacy for newborns. In theory, these 
permits are issued to couples who are entitled to bear a child during that 
year. In Hua Shan cadres noted that couples who have been married longer 
and are still childless have first priority. However, birth permits are not 
issued until after the birth, to avoid having permits illegally transferred to 
another party. Thus, rather than formally designate who has priority, bri­
gade women’s leaders wait to see who becomes pregnant. It is assumed that 
newlyweds will want to have a child right away; despite national policy, 
nothing is done to discourage early pregnancy beyond the minimal verbal 
advocacy of late childbirth by brigade and commune cadres."*®
A third duty of family-planning cadres is to coordinate the supply and 
distribution of birth control supplies. Unlike the “top to bottom” process of
«IF 4A-1-2 (82.4.9).
«IF lK-10-11 (82.12.1); IF lB-5 (82.10.14).
«IF lE-8 (82.5.23); IF lF-15 (82.10.12); IF lG-8 (82.10.28); IF lH-16 (82.11.14); IF lJ-11 
(82.11.9).
♦MF lC-4 (82.4.6); IF lF-14 (82.10.12); IF lG-11 (82.10.28); IF lJ-11 (82.11.9).
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allocating births, the supplying of contraceptives relies on a “bottom to top” 
reporting system. Brigade and team women’s leaders go from door to door 
gathering information on needed supplies of contraceptives. Their reports 
are submitted to the commune cadre, who in turn submits a request to the 
district officer. On the basis of these local reports, annual plans prepared at 
the district, municipal, and provincial levels flow up the family-planning 
bureaucracy to Beijing. On the basis of national estimates for needed con­
traceptive supplies, the State Family Planning Commission coordinates with 
the State Pharmaceutical Bureau, which is responsible for setting production 
plans for pharmaceutical companies under its jurisdiction. Thus, m Wuhan 
municipality the local pharmaceutical company provides the family­
planning office with supplies on a monthly schedule, and district-level cadres 
are responsible for collecting the monthly quota from designated phar­
maceutical stations throughout the city. In turn, cadres from lower units 
must travel to the district office to pick up their monthly allotments and 
arrange for the distribution to individual households."*^^
The fourth responsibility of local family-planning cadres is to monitor 
implementation of the birth plan by regularly inspecting the conduct of work 
at lower levels. According to the commune Women’s Federation Head, 
however, district personnel come to the commune twice a year for formal 
investigations, and commune family-planning cadres make scheduled visits 
to each of Hua Shan’s nineteen brigades four times a year.'^® Below the com­
mune level, formal, periodic investigations give way to sustained monitoring 
of village conditions by brigade and team women’s leaders.
The fifth task of family-planning cadres is to visit localities or homes at the 
request of lower-level cadres. When faced with recalcitrant couples who can­
not be persuaded to take “remedial measures” to terminate a pregnancy, 
team or brigade family-planning workers often call in more authoritative 
personages in their unit (i.e., team or brigade leaders, or Party branch secre­
taries), or higher-level family-planning cadres, to help persuade them to 
abort. In line with reports throughout the country, Hong Shan district cadres 
admit they encounter stiff resistance from those who have a strong aversion 
to the policy.'^® Nevertheless, couples unwilling to abort a pregnancy, espe­
cially a third pregnancy, find themselves under enormous lateral and vertical 
pressure from those who have complied with the policy and from cadres bent 
on enforcement.
The sixth job of family-planning cadres is to compile family-planning 
records. These records, which include data on births, deaths, single-child 
households, contraceptive methods, abortions, and even menstrual cycles,
47IF lB-9-10 (82.10.14); IF lK-3 (82.12.1).
♦siF lA-8 (82.4.6).
«IF lK-11-12 (82.12.1).
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are compiled from the team level up. This process of data compilation has 
two purposes: First, it enables local and higher authorities to monitor the 
progress of the population plan. Second, it is necessary to evaluate the per­
formance of each unit against an array of goals (or quotas) set at the start of 
the year and to reward high achievers. For example, Hua Shan had five
family-planning goals in 1982:
Goal Value
Birthrate: 13.5 per 1,000 40%
“Only-child certificate” rate: 85% of all only-child couples 30%
Late marriage: 90% of marriages 10%
Rate of planned births: 90% of all births 10%
Utilization of birth control: 100% of couples of childbearing age 10%
If the commune achieved 100 percent of its targets, the Party secretary, com­
mune director, and family-planning cadre each received a bonus of 20 yuan. 
For each target they missed, its value was deducted from this bonus. Brigade 
cadres who met their quotas each received 30 yuan.^°
From this review of the multilevel organization for implementing the 
population program, several conclusions can be drawn. First, there is no 
question of the efficacy of the organization; penetrating to the team level, 
the structure is adequate both for the delivery of technical services and for 
administrative oversight. Second, administrative costs are held down by 
utilizing available nontechnical personnel to administer the birth plan and 
to monitor compliance. In the case of Hua Shan only one cadre was added, 
at state expense, to handle family-planning work. The remaining work­
ers were already holding administrative posts, thus drawing their income 
from the collective. And third, by supplying birth control supplies directly to 
the home through this same organization, the state minimizes organizational 
complexity and competition at the local level and eliminates the need to 
mobilize couples to acquire contraceptives on their own.
The system also has critical weaknesses, however, which have become 
more apparent under the strain of increasingly ambitious goals for population 
control. First, although the co-optation of local cadres as family-planning 
workers minimizes administrative costs, the result is a specialized family­
planning bureaucracy highly dependent on nonspecialized local personnel 
to enforce the population program. As with rural programs of the past, 
this one has been plagued by two disruptive responses from local cadres. 
The first is overzealousness on the part of those eager to overfulfill state 
plans. This phenomenon was especially common during the early stages 
of the one-child campaign, the most notorious example occurring in Fujian
“IF lB-12-13 (82.10.14).
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province, where it was charged that women were forcefully taken to health 
clinics for abortions and sterilizations.^*
In Hong Shan district, too, it was clear that 1979 and 1980 had been 
periods of mobilization of those with two or more children to undergo ster­
ilizations. Of the 63,400 couples of childbearing age in the district, approx­
imately 10 percent had undergone sterilization procedures by 1982. Accord­
ing to a district family-planning cadre, 80 percent of this total occurred in 
1979 alone, and most of these individuals already had two or three 
children.52 In Hua Shan commune, data from several brigades also indicate 
that a disproportionately high number of sterilizations occurred in 1979 and 
again in 1983. In Yan Jiang brigade, for example, of the total of 170 steriliza­
tions which had been performed by early 1982, 120 occurred in 1979 alone. 
Here the brigade women’s leader proudly stated that she and all team 
women’s leaders had undergone sterilizations to set a good example. Similar­
ly, in Hong Guang brigade 113 out of 166 sterilizations performed by the end 
of 1983 occurred in 1979, or 68 percent of the total. In 1983, an additional 52 
sterilizations occurred, with only one occurring in the intervening three years 
(1980-82). In Hua Shan and He Dong brigades more than half of the total 
number of sterilizations performed by the end of 1983 occurred in 1983 alone; 
in Hua Shan 99 out of 162 (61%) occurred in that year, and in He Dong 34 
out of 48 (70%) occurred in 1983.^3 Abortion totals for the commune were 
also high in the early 1980s, with a ratio in 1980 of 68 abortions for each 100 
births, 65 abortions for each 100 births in 1981, and 78 abortions for each 100 
births in 1982.^'*
A series of reports out of Guangdong in 1981 on mobilizations for con­
traceptive surgery also illustrate the consequences of cadre zealousness. In 
Huiyang prefecture 102,400 operations were carried out in fifty days during 
May and June 1981, 27,000 in one month in Dongguan county alone.^^ In 
1982 provincial leaders announced their intention to carry out two “shock 
attacks” during the year.^® National leaders concede that “instances of 
compulsion” do occur, but that they are “impermissible.As with the case 
of Guangdong’s “shock attacks,” however, it may be difficult to judge where 
persuasion ends and coercion begins.
The other response detrimental to the program has been the complete
Leo A. Orleans, China’s Population Policies and Population Data: Review and Update (Washing­
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 18-19.
52IF lK-10 (82.12.1).
53IF lE-9 (82.5.23); Interview File No. 6 (84.3.10), 5, 12; Interview File No. 4 (84.3.3), 14.
5tIF lB-10 (82.10.14); Interview File No. 3 (84.2.28), 12.
55Guangdong Provincial Service, Aug. 28, 1981, in FBIS, Sept. 1, 1981, P5; Xinhua, Sept. 11, 
1981, in FBIS, Sept. 16, 1981, PI.
5^Guangdong Provincial Service, Feb. 27, 1982, in FBIS, Mar. 4, 1982, P5.
52 See Xinhua report on Hua Guofeng’s report to the Third Session of the Fifth National 
People’s Congress, Sept. 7, 1980, in FBIS, Sept. 8, 1980, LlO-11.
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neglect of family-planning work. Rural cadres, sympathetic to the plight of 
lahor-poor households and susceptible to the “feudal idea” of preferring 
male to female offspring, may nominally implement family-planning regula­
tions but be blind to policy infractions.^® In Hua Shan one brigade women’s 
leader resignedly noted that “people want to have boys; what can we do?”^^ 
Moreover, some cadres find themselves in the awkward position of enforcing 
the one-child stricture on relatives or kinsmen in tight-knit or single-lineage 
villages, as well as exercising childbearing restraint at home.®®
Higher authorities have limited options for securing the compliance of 
rural cadres. Threats of demotion, often used against urban cadres, are less 
potent in villages, where the benefits that accrue from leadership posts do not 
necessarily outweigh the costs. With respect to material benefits, new agri­
cultural policies reduce the motivations for accepting administrative posts, 
which reduce the time available for household production but offer little re­
muneration. Another option, the offer of bonuses for plan fulfillment, may 
also be of limited utility. Weighing the value of a potential bonus against the 
time and effort that would have to be expended in order to receive it, local 
cadres may conclude that the time can be more profitably spent elsewhere.
Another factor affecting cadre enthusiasm and commitment is the lack of 
remuneration for their efforts.®* Below the commune level, the bulk of family­
planning work falls to brigade and team women’s leaders, none of whom 
receive special compensation for their efforts. Wage scales set in earlier years 
for brigade women’s leaders had not been adjusted by 1982 to account for the 
added responsibilities. Thus, in Hua Shan, for example, these women re­
ceived salaries consistently lower than those of other male brigade committee 
members who hold a lower rank. In three brigades, salaries of brigade 
women’s leaders were from 84 to 91 percent of the salaries of other deputy 
brigade leaders, and only 87 to 91 percent of the salaries of lower-ranking 
male administrative committee members.®^ At the team level women’s lead­
ers received no administrative salary, and thus were not monetarily compen­
sated for their family-planning work.
^“Yunnan Provincial Service, Jan. 6, 1980, in TR/S, Jan. 14, 1980, Ql; Guangdong Provincial 
Service, Sept. 5, 1981, in FBIS, Sept. 9, 1981, P2; Chen Guomo, “Nongcun Shixing Shengchan 
Zerenzhi Zemyang ba Jihua Shengyu Baijinqu” (How to Arrange Planned Parenthood Work 
in Villages Which Implement the Production Responsibility System), RenkouyuJingji, 1982, no. 
4; 39.
59IF lF-14 (82.10.12).
Press accounts are replete with examples of errant cadres at all levels who violated the 
policy or were persuaded to take contraceptive measures. Guangming Ribao, Sept. 7, 1979, in 
FBIS, Sept. 19, 1979, Ql-2; Hunan Provincial Service, Sept. 23, 1979, in FBIS, Sept. 26, 1979, 
P2—3; Renmin Ribao, Apr. 11, 1980, 4; Zhongguo Nongmin Bao, July 4, 1982, 3.
Zhang and Cao (n, 32 above), 13; Daghong Ribao, Sept. 29, 1981, in FBIS, Oct. 19, 1981, 
01-2; Henan Provincial Service, Feb. 19, 1982, in FBIS, Feb. 22, 1982, P3-4.
62IF 5B-8 (82.3.30); IF 5E-8 (82.10.8); IF 5D-8 (82.5.11).
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A third problem to emerge has been abuse of family-planning workers. 
Not only are these individuals subject to verbal abuse, there have been 
reports of violence against them.®^ The threat of violence, taken together 
with the other factors discussed above, is a powerful disincentive to actively 
pursue defiant couples.
A second major weakness in the organization is the system of reporting. 
Statistics are gathered and maintained by family-planning and Party cadres 
at each level of administration. Although higher cadres go to localities 
periodically to investigate, it is impossible to get independent verification of 
local records, short of a house-to-house survey. Thus, district cadres must 
accept the statistics provided by commune cadres who, in turn, have relied 
on the reports from brigade cadres. This system of in-house verification 
leaves a wide margin for tampering with figures to fulfill the local plan. 
Errors, intentional or accidental, may be passed up through the administra­
tive network undetected. Equally important, higher cadres overseeing family 
planning have little or no incentive to seek out errors, with bonuses and 
commendations at stake. With no independent auditing mechanism, then, 
errors in the reporting system are likely to multiply
A related problem is the manipulation of registration records. In many 
localities, households have been denied registration for unplanned births. 
Additionally, reports have circulated concerning manipulation of the system 
by people who go to the city or another village to have a child and then 
return to their rural or urban homes.®® There, cadres are told that the baby 
was born to relatives and is registered elsewhere. Because the child is actual­
ly not registered in either location, and because sympathetic cadres have no 
incentive to uncover the deception, it goes unreported.
Two additional weaknesses are found in the delivery system for family­
planning services. The first is the quality of medical services available. 
In some localities, low-quality medical procedures have caused patient 
injuries.®® Moreover, those who suffer such injuries are sometimes denied
“Tonghua County Family Planning Office, “Cong Yingebu Gongshe Lishugou Daduide 
Gongzuo Chengguo Tantao Jihua Shengyude Gongzuo Fangfa” (From the Work Achievements 
of Yingebu Commune’s Lishugou Brigade Discuss the Work Methods of Planned Parenthood), 
Renkouxue Kan (Demography Journal), 1982, no. 2: 53; Zong Xin, Bai Jian, “Shilun Nongcun 
Shengchan Zerenzhi yu Jihua Shengyu” (Exploratory Discussion of the Rural Production Re­
sponsibility System and Planned Parenthood), Renkouxue Kan, 1982, no. 1; 10; Hubei Ribao, Apr. 
12, 1982, 2; Hubei Ribao, Nov. 12, 1982, 2.
6-'Beginning in 1980, Chinese sources admitted that population statistics were among the 
types of data subject to falsification at the local level. See John Aird, “Recent Demographic Data 
from China: Problems and Prospects,” in China Under the Four Modernizations (n. 3 above), 202-3.
esChangshan County Family Planning Office, “Lun Nongcun yi sheng Liangtai Yuling Fufu 
Ying Shixing Jiezha” (Rural Couples of Childbearing Age with Two Children Should Undergo 
Operations), Zhejiang Renkou Tongxun (Zhejiang Population Bulletin), 1983, no. 2. 34.
66 Evidence on medical “accidents” is implied through press accounts that refer to the need to 
improve the quality of technical services and reduce the number of accidents. Xinhua, ]an. 10, 
1983, in FBIS,}&n. 13, 1983, K15; China Daily, ]an. 4, 1983, 1.
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medical treatment for them.®^ Also common is the improper installation of 
intrauterine devices, with some localities reporting lUD failure rates of as 
high as 20 percent of all wearers.®® To improve the quality of medical ser­
vices, some localities are offering bonuses to doctors who perform consistent­
ly without any “accidents.”®® Though the technique of offering bonuses is 
seen as a positive incentive to reduce errors and improve medical quality, it 
may also encourage medical personnel to perform the maximum number of 
procedures possible, even to the detriment of women’s health. The second 
problem with the delivery system for family-planning services is the provi­
sion of contraceptive supplies. As with many other commodities, the supply 
and distribution system for contraceptives is flawed. Shortages afflict major 
cities like Beijing, as well as rural areas, disrupting family-planning efforts.^® 
To summarize, the organization for family planning suffers from adminis­
trative and technical weaknesses. The administrative weaknesses derive from 
the dependency of the system on local cadres, especially brigade and team 
cadres, to carry out family-planning work. Because these individuals are 
sympathetic to peasant desires for larger families, because the work is hard 
and the payoff small, and because there is no independent oversight of their 
performance, those who choose to ignore or loosen the policy run little risk in 
doing so. Technically, the system suffers from problems of supply and quality 
of service, further impeding progress toward the goal of one child per couple.
The Impact of the Agricultural Responsibility System 
A fourth impediment to implementing the population program has been the 
policy environment. Agricultural reforms, and particularly the agricultural 
responsibility system (ARS), have posed major obstacles to family-planning 
work. In its most liberal form, the ARS allows households or individuals to 
contract for a specific production quota. Land is parceled out for use by a 
household, for example, which is responsible for supplying and utilizing the 
inputs necessary to reach the assigned quota. Households or individuals bear
®^For example, Shaanxi’s regulations on family planning include the stipulation that “medi­
cal units should improve the quality of surgery and ensure safety. They must provide treatment 
for accidents and illness caused by this surgery,” Shaanxi Provincial Service, May 3, 1981, in 
FBIS, May 4, 1981, T5.
Zhang Xinxia, “Qian Tan Yuling Funu Qingkuangde Xin Bianhua” (Discuss the New 
Changes in the Conditions of Childbearing Age Women), Renkouyu Jingji, 1982, no. 3: 47. In 
Hong Shan district, cadres estimate that about 20 percent of all lUD wearers have problems 
with it, such as slippage and expulsion; of these, it was said that “many” get pregnant. IF lK-11 
(82.12.1).
^^Jiefang Ribao, Aug. 10, 1981, 3, in FBIS, Sept. 2, 1981, 05; Xin Dan, Peng Zhiliang, 
“Sichuan Sheng Peng Xian Shixing Jieyu Jishu Zerenzhide Jingyan” (The Experience of 
Sichuan Province’s Peng County in Carrying Out a Birth Control Technical Responsibility 
System), Renkou Yanjiu, 1982, no. 6: 29-31.
™Beijing City Service, Aug. 24, 1981, in FBIS, Sept. 4, 1981, Rl; Beijing Domestic Service, 
Feb. 25, 1981, in FBIS, Feb. 26, 1981, L2-3; Zong Xin, Bai Jian (n. 63 above), 13.
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all responsibility for meeting quotas, and income is tied directly to their own 
production. In short, the basic accounting unit reverts to the household, with 
team or brigade units acting mainly as agents for the household in the 
marketing process.
This system of full responsibility {da bao gan) has been detrimental to the 
population plan in four ways. First, as was discussed above, division of land 
generally has been based on the amount of household labor power, with the 
result that labor-rich households receive more land, often boosting their in­
comes faster than their labor-poor neighbors can. This pattern of distribution 
sets a negative example for young couples already influenced by traditional 
values and family pressures.
Second, under da bao gan, brigade cadres receive parcels of land along with 
other peasants, and are assigned production quotas. Whereas they formerly 
drew administrative salaries from the collective, under this system all or a 
part of their income from the collective comes from cultivating their allot­
ment of land. In three Hua Shan brigades, for example, two brigade leaders 
got land allotments 50 percent the size given to a full-time male laborer, and 
one got 30 percent of the allotment. Other brigade cadres also got 50 percent 
allotments, and team-level cadres got 50 percent or more.^' As a result, 
cadres have tended to neglect administrative duties of all types, including 
family-planning work, preferring to busy themselves on their assigned plots 
of land in an effort to boost their income from production.^2
Another effect of the ARS has been to diminish or deplete local welfare 
funds, from which benefits are paid to holders of one-child certificates. Under 
the old system, collective income was distributed after the team had siphoned 
off funds for the welfare fund and various expenses. Now individuals and 
households are entitled to receive directly all the income from their produc­
tion, from which they must pay the agricultural tax and contribute to the 
welfare fund. As a result, the fund sometimes has less money than before, 
since the team no longer has the discretionary power to set the annual con­
tribution levels. At the same time, a heavier burden has been placed on the 
fund to provide for the medical and educational costs and other rewards 
promised to single-child couples. The result, in some instances, has been 
depletion of the fund without providing all the promised rewards.” In Hua 
Shan, data from two brigades does demonstrate that collective welfare funds 
have diminished since 1979. In one brigade the fund was cut in half between 
1979 and 1981, dipping from 12,000 to 6,000 yuan. In a second brigade, the 
1981 welfare fund of 4,648 yuan was only 36 percent of the 1979 level of
’'IF6E-12 (82.10.8); IF6G-10 (82.11.4); IF 6H-6 (82.11.9).
Liaoning Provincial Service, Oct. 25, 1981, in FBIS, Oct. 28, 1981, S3; Zhu Mian (n. 32 
above), 27, 29; Cui Fengyuan, “Guanyu Wo Guo Nongcun Funu Shengyu Lu Wenti” (On the 
Question of Our Country’s Rural Women’s Birth Rate), RenkoujuJingji, 1982, no. 2:50.
Zhang and Gao (n. 32 above), 13; Zhu Mian, 27.
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12,974 yuan. In both cases, the dramatic drop occurred in 1980 when the 
responsibility system was introduced into the area.^*^
The responsibility system has also posed problems for tbe enforcement of 
penalties. Where tbe work-point system remains in effect, teams can deduct a 
percentage of work points earned from those who violate the policy. How­
ever, where this system has been abolished, as under da bao gan, taking 
deductions from salaries becomes more problematic, since income flows 
directly to the peasants.Moreover, as peasants begin to utilize private 
supply and marketing cooperatives, now being encouraged by tbe state, local 
cadres will have no basis for determining household income beyond the 
value of contractually stipulated quotas. Since “within-quota” income will 
constitute an increasingly lower percentage of total household income, cadres 
who do persist in enforcement may find that such penalties fail to deter offen­
ders.
In short, the responsibility system, by its very success, added to the dif­
ficulty of population-control work. It demonstrated the economic value inher­
ent in labor power, further undermined the commitment of local cadres to 
family-planning work, and disrupted the system of rewards and penalties on 
which compliance largely depends. Thus, as the da bao gan system spread 
across China between 1980 and 1983 (see chapter 9), population growth 
rates rose to a peak of 14.55 per 1,000 in 1981 and remained high at 14.49 in 
1982. Moreover, as the contract system stabilized in 1983 and emphasis was 
placed on extended contracts, single-child households who had not benefited 
under the initial land-division process were told that no further readjust­
ments of landholding would be made. In Hua Shan one brigade women’s 
leader conceded that the failure to provide extra allotments of land was a 
primary cause of the poor state of family-planning work in her village.^®
TOWARD IMPROVING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
POPULATION POLICY
Faced with this intricate mix of implementation problems, the regime has 
attempted or proposed several concrete solutions: (1) the drafting of a family­
planning law; (2) the provision of retirement insurance; (3) the enforcement 
of a “dual contract” system linking family planning with agricultural pro­
duction; and (4) conducting family-planning propaganda and mobilization 
campaigns.
In an effort to enforce uniform national guidelines, a family-planning law
^“^This drop cannot be attributed to decreases in the overall solvency of the brigades. In both 
cases, total production value, net income, and per capita income all increased between 1979 and 
1981. IF 7E-8-9 (82.10.12); IF 7G-8-9 (82.11.2).
Zhang and Cao, 13; Zhang Huaiyu (n. 20 above), 37.
Interview File No. 6 (84.3.10), 10, 15.
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was drafted by the Family Planning Office of the State Council and sub­
mitted for discussion by the Commission on Legislative Affairs of the 
Fifth National People’s Congress. According to a report by Peng Zhen, vice- 
chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, the draft went through several 
revisions between June 1979 and September 1980, and was originally sched­
uled to be submitted for approval at the Third Session of the Fifth NPC in 
September 1980. In explaining why it was not submitted, Peng noted that 
some “unresolved problems” remained and that “the draft is not the result of 
consensus of all quarters.”’^
A number of factors probably contributed to the failure to adopt a family­
planning law. First, according to a Xinhua report in July 1979 during the 
Second Session of the Fifth NPC, the draft law included specific regulations 
concerning the rewards to be given to single-child families in both urban and 
rural settings. Such specificity would have required localities with widely 
differing economic and demographic characteristics to adopt uniform regula­
tions, even if these were inappropriate to local conditions.
Second, the imposition of a national law that specified the obligations of 
localities to provide special incentives for single-child couples, while making 
no provision for financial compensation, could hardly have been welcomed 
by delegates to the NPC sessions. As early as 1980 a report from Guangdong 
referred to “the impossibility of implementing the policy of rewards and 
punishments due to a lack of funds.”’® Moreover, this issue had been dis­
cussed at an earlier October 1979 State Council meeting. According to Li 
Xiuzhen, then deputy director of the State Council’s Family Planning Lead­
ing Group, the vice-premiers present agreed that the State Council should 
allot “some money” (jibufen qian) for the purpose of providing rewards to 
single-child couples. The issue was not resolved, however, but held over for 
“additional research.”’® In short, although it was easy to agree in principle 
to state subsidization of the costs of a family-planning-incentive program, the 
politics of budgetary allocation precluded any immediate solution.
Third, there continued to be numerous concerns about the imposition of a 
one-child policy, if not outright opposition. Most prominent were concerns 
about (1) an aging of the population (laohua), (2) a reduction in the size of the 
labor force and the pool of eligible military recruits, and (3) the increasing 
numbers of elderly people dependent on state welfare subsidies.®® Although
FBIS, Supplement No. 76, Sept. 23, 1980, 35.
™FBIS, May 20, 1980, P2.
’9 Li Xiuzhen, “Dangqian Jihua Shengyu Gongzuode Xingshi he Renwu” (The Current 
Situation and Tasks in Family Planning Work), Renkou Yanjiu, 1980, no. 1:4.
^Xinhua, Dec. 22, 1979, in FBIS, Dec. 28, 1979, L8-9; Xinhua, Feb. 13, 1980, in FBIS, Feb. 
15, 1980, L12-13; Chang Wen and Xin Hai, “Nongye Baochan dao Zu hou Jihua Shengyu 
Congzuo Ruhe Kaizhan—Sichuan Sheng Mianzhu Xian Jihua Shengyu Congzuo Diaocha” 
(How to Do Family Planning Work After Output Quotas Were Assigned to Croups in
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such arguments were countered in the press, they continued to provide a 
concrete rationale for all who opposed the stringency of the one-child pro­
gram. In the end, no family-planning law was passed; instead, the new 
constitution adopted in December 1982 contained a much milder provision 
making family planning an obligatory practice.®*
Concern over the welfare of the elderly was especially serious among the 
rural population. For the present, however, the state has no remedy for the 
crucial problem of peasants’ old-age security. It advocates the establishment 
of retirement pensions or “homes of respect for the aged,” but the imple­
mentation and funding of these programs is left to the localities. Consequent­
ly, most rural villages do not have either retirement homes or pensions.®*^ As 
of 1981 less than 1 percent of the rural elderly were covered by pensions or 
housed in retirement homes, and average income from pensions was only 10 
to 15 yuan a month.®® At that rate, pensions for the approximately 40 million 
elderly in the rural areas would cost the state about 5 billion yuan a year.
Proposed alternatives to direct state subsidies include the levying of a 
supplemental agricultural tax to provide for long-term social security 
needs,®^ or joint contributions from the state, collectives, and individuals, 
creating a fund to be administered by the family-planning departments or by 
a specially created organ.®® Although plausible in theory, in practice such 
schemes would present a host of organizational, management, and distri­
bution problems to those charged with implementation, and would require 
substantial outlays of state funds, above and beyond monies targeted for old- 
age support, to support the bureaucracy that would inevitably be created. 
Moreover, the establishment of a system of old-age support cannot be ex­
pected to bring immediate returns in terms of fewer rural births. Its reliabil­
ity could only be proven after many years of uninterrupted payments to 
peasants, who in the meantime may be hedging their bets by having a second 
or third child.
Moreover, with the current emphasis on reducing peasants’ financial bur­
dens, including their contribution to such programs as family planning and
Agriculture—An Investigation of the Family Planning Work in Mianzhu County, Sichuan 
Province), in Zhongguo Renkou Kexue Lunji (Symposium ofChinese Population Science), edited by 
The Institute of Population Economics, Beijing College of Economics (Beijing: China Academic 
Publishers, 1981), 189.
Zkonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa, 1982 (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of 
China) (Beijing; People’s Publishers, 1982), 27.
Zhongguo Baike Nianjian, 1982, 646.
Zhongguo Baike Nianjian, 1981, 545.
®"^Cheng Du (n. 8 above), 56.
®^Zhou Shigang, “Dui Nongcun Du Sheng Zinu Jiating Shixing Laonian Shehui Baoxian 
Tantao” (An Inquiry into the Implementation of Old-Age Social Insurance in the Villages), 
Renkou Yanjiu, 1983, no. 5:55.
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old-age insurance, it is unlikely that either the wide-scale establishment of 
state-local cooperative insurance programs or locally funded programs will 
occur in the near future. A circular issued by the Agricultural Research 
OfiSce of the CPC Secretariat in November 1983 advocates the establishment 
of homes for the elderly {jinglaoyuan) only where local conditions permit, and 
only by decision of the local populace.®^ Left with the choice of contributing 
to the maintenance of retirement homes or supporting a second or third 
child, peasants will undoubtedly continue to prefer the economic potential of 
additional children to the state’s promise of a stable welfare system m the
future.
Neither a State Family Planning Law nor a comprehensive rural system ot 
retirement support addresses the short-term problem of gaining the com­
pliance of rural cadres and of couples of childbearing age. With the family­
planning structure disrupted at the local level by the spread of household 
contracting in 1981 and 1982, China’s leaders became increasingly vocal 
supporters of the “dual contract” {shuang bao) system, linking agricultural 
production quotas with family-planning quotas.®^ The first national public­
ity for such a system came in 1981, when People’s Daily reported on the ex­
perience of an Anhui prefecture with the new system. Localities in Sichuan 
and Jilin also began experimenting with this approach in late 1980 and early
1981.88
The “dual contract” system requires that household or individual con­
tracts for agricultural production include a clause for family planning, com­
mitting the signatory to uphold the local birth plan by not having an un­
planned child. The contract also specifies the consequences for failing to 
comply, whether they be cash penalties, higher state quotas, or in more ex­
treme cases, forfeiting one’s right to contract land for production.89 Typi­
cally, commune, brigade, and team cadres are also required to sip contracts 
with their superiors committing themselves to meet specified family-planning 
goals. Unlike peasants who forfeit part of their income if found m violation of 
the policy, however, cadres generally have at stake only bonuses, not their
basic income.80 ^
According to Hong Shan district family-planning officials, this system be­
gan to be implemented in 1982. Demonstrating the policy autonomy of lower 
units, however, Hua Shan officials were totally unfamiliar with the term
^^Zhongguo Nongmin Bao,l^ov. 17, 1983, 1. oo i •
87 See, for example, the comments of Qian Xinzhong in China Daily, Jan. 4, 1983, 1, m tUIi,
Jan. 5, 1983, K24.
B80n Anhui, see Renmin Ribao, June 16, 1981; also, Renmin Ribao, Aug. 18, 1981, 4; Chen
Guomo (n. 58 above), 39 and 38. . ^ is
89 For specific examples of contracts in force, see Zhu Mian, 29, and Zhang and Cao, 14 15
(n. 32 above); Chen Guomo, 39 and 38.
90IF lK-6 (82.12.1).
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shuang bao as late as October 1982.®' Explaining this, district officials said 
that three communes in the district had taken the lead in implementing this 
program, with 90 percent of commune members operating under it. Of the 
remaining communes, eight had adopted the system, which covered 80 per­
cent of their members. Only Hua Shan was said to have failed to adopt the 
system.
By June 1984, however, the same officials indicated that the provisions of 
the “dual contract” system, where implemented, were no different than the 
local regulations had been before the contracts were enforced. In other 
words, the contracts did not link production quotas or landholding to family 
planning. Instead, they simply specified the same rewards and penalties 
already in effect. Moreover, these officials noted that the “dual contract” 
system was also weakened because of failure to coordinate with legal depart­
ments to ensure that the family-planning contract was legally binding. As a 
result, it was judged an ineffective measure in that district.
Thus, where the “dual contract” system was strictly enforced, the effect 
may have been to reduce substantially the incidence of unplanned births. 
However, adoption and enforcement of the “dual contract” system, like 
other regulations, also rested with local cadres, many of whom apparently 
chose not to adopt it or, if pushed from above to adopt it, not to enforce it. 
Cadres sympathetic to peasant concerns undoubtedly took little pleasure in 
inflicting higher state quotas on offending households, much less denying 
them the right to contract for “responsibility fields.”
Although the overall effectiveness of the “dual contract” system is difficult 
to judge, it is clear that the 1982 population growth rate was only marginally 
lower than the 1981 rate, both of which were far in excess of national targets. 
By August 1982, participants in a family-planning work conference were well 
aware that work was suffering under the combined influence of “feudal” 
childbearing attitudes and agricultural reforms.Thus, plans were made to 
launch a Family Planning Propaganda Month in early 1983 to popularize 
{puji) family-planning policy, birth control knowledge, physiology, hygiene, 
and eugenics.®^
This meeting was followed in November by a Family Planning Propagan­
da Work Meeting, which outlined plans for the campaign extending from 
January 1, 1983, through Spring Festival in February. Armed with the 
alarming results of the July 1982 census,®^ Family Planning Commission 
director Qian Xinzhong made clear in his remarks to the meeting that the
9>IF lF-14 (82.10.12).
Interview File No. 16 (84.6.6), 3.
Beijing Domestic Service, Aug. 16, 1982, in FBIS, Aug. 24, 1982, K14.
^“^Peng Zhiliang, “Ba Jihua Shengyu Gongzuo Tigao dao yige Xin Shuiping” (Raise Family 
Planning Work to a New Level), Renkou Yanjiu, 1982, no. 6:22.
^^Renmin Ribao, Oct. 28, 1982, 1, 4.
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“propaganda” month would combine talk with action—that is, require cou­
ples of childbearing age with two or more children to undergo sterilization.^® 
Faced with the intransigence of rural couples who violated the population 
policy by having a second child, and lacking any effective means of dealing 
with them, the state shifted its emphasis to the continuing problem of multi­
ple births \duotai). With third or additional births still comprising 28 percent 
of all births in 1981 and 24 percent in 1982 despite the official policy of strict 
prohibition, it was determined that significant improvements could be made 
in the birth rate and population growth rate in 1983 by concentrating re­
sources on this offending group.®’ Moreover, reducing the number of multi­
ple births would make possible an increase in the number of second births 
which could be permitted under state plans.
Thus, Family Planning Propaganda Month was a peak mobilization 
period. According to a January 1983 Xinhua report, “1.37 million propagan­
da workers” and “over 138,000 medical workers were trained in fourteen 
provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions to carry out the month’s 
activities, and in ten provinces approximately 226,000 sterilizations were 
performed between December 1982 and January 10, 1983. By the end of 
February “incomplete statistics” indicated that 8.86 million “birth control 
operations” had been performed nationally.®® Although the total number of 
sterilizations performed nation wide during the campaign is unclear, its 
impact can be seen in statistics from Hubei province, where one million 
sterilizations occurred during 1983, constituting almost one-third of the cu­
mulative provincial total of 3,020,000.®® In Wuhan alone, one million yuan 
drawn from the municipal finance department was spent on this extra­
ordinary effort, dwarfing the annual family-planning budget of 600,000 
yuan.'00 Nevertheless, faced with a hostile rural population, an inability to 
eliminate the occurrence of third or more births, and a high incidence of 
abortions—costly in both human and economic terms—family-planning 
officials concluded that “persuading” all those with two or more children 
to undergo sterilization was the most effective and economical alternative
“Qian Xinzhong, “Nuli Kaichuang Jihua Shengyu Xuanchuan Jiaoyu Gongzuo Xin 
Jumian—Zai Chuanguo Jihua Shengyu Xuanchuan Gongzuo Huiyishangde Jianghua” (Make 
Great Efforts to Initiate a New Phase in Family Planning Propaganda and Education Work- 
Speech delivered at the National Family Planning Propaganda Work Conference), Renkouxue 
Kan, 1983, no. 1:9. See also, Beijing Review, 1983, no. 7 (Feb. 14): 23.
s’For the 1981 figure on multiple births, see Qian Xinzhong, “Evolution of China’s Popula­
tion Policy,” Beijing Review, 1984, no. 3 (Jan. 16): 19. For 1982, see Liang Jimin, Peng Zhiliang, 
“Quanmian Zhunquede Lijie he Zhixing Dangde Jihua Shengyu Fangzhen Zhengce” (Under­
stand and Implement the Party’s Family Planning Policies in an All-Round and Accurate Way), 
Renkou Yanjiu, 1984, no. 3:12.
98FB/5,Jan. 13, 1983, K13-14; FBIS, Mar. 3, 1983, Kll.
Interview File No. 14 (84.6.8), 8.
'^Interview File No. 15 (84.6.7), 9—10.
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available. Although this mobilizational technique was no panacea for the 
myriad problems of local-level implementation, the sustained emphasis on 
sterilization throughout 1983 and 1984 undoubtedly contributed to a reduc­
tion of the annual population growth rates to an estimated 11.54 per 1,000 in 
1983 and 10.8 per 1,000 in 1984.'oi
CONCLUSIONS
In any look at China’s efforts with population control in the rural areas, 
the capacity of the regime to enforce changed behavior patterns, and in this 
case, childbearing behavior patterns, should not be underestimated. Indeed, 
compared with the lack of connection between government and village 
throughout much of the world, Beijing’s penetration to the household is 
awesome. In 1979, mobilization campaigns for “voluntary” sterilizations, 
abortions, and adoption of contraceptive measures were widespread, and 
the fine line between persuasion and coercion was crossed frequently.
Despite the growing desire of the central leadership to move away from 
this method of implementation, in 1979 mobilization was the only mecha­
nism available for ensuring the rapid exposure of the rural population to birth 
control education and their adoption of birth control methods. Provincial- 
level regulations were being issued, but months would go by before rural 
localities actively began to enforce them. In addition. Party-directed mobi­
lization was the only means by which to cut through the bureaucracy and 
compel propaganda, health, family-planning, pharmaceutical, and financial 
departments to cooperate in the provision of the requisite human and mate­
rial resources. Local-level cadres, placed under familiar pressures, reacted in 
familiar ways, assuming that their performance would be judged first and 
foremost on the achievement of numerical quotas, and that this campaign, 
like others before it, would peak, wane, and end.
Instead, central leaders, still lacking the organization for administrative 
enforcement, upped the ante by formalizing the one-child policy in 1980 and 
firmly extending it to the rural areas. This time, however, Party cadres at all 
levels would themselves resist being the vehicle of implementation, because 
of (1) a lack of support for the policy; (2) an impatience with a policy viewed 
by many as a nuisance; (3) a tendency to view family planning as a women’s 
issue, and thus, of low priority; and (4) a preoccupation with the ongoing 
agricultural reform process.
With rural Party discipline thus weakened, and with the penetration of
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the state family-planning bureaucracy dependent on these same personn , 
central leaders were compelled to modify the content of population policy m 
the short term while building a reliable and professional fami y-plannmg 
organization over the long term. Thus, some peasant complaints were 
addressed by increasing the number of categories m which it was acceptable 
to have a second child. Simultaneously, however, all those with two or more 
children were to be persuaded to undergo sterilization. Although *1® |-
lizational technique was at odds with the policy preferences of Chinas 
leadership, its use was preferable to program failure, an outcome all too 
conceivable from the vantage point of mid-1982. In addition, the mobi iza- 
tion campaign had the advantage, as always, of generating local-level com­
pliance as a result of increased pressure from above. Moreover, with wor 
teams composed of family-planning and medical personnel descending on 
rural villages, cadres were obliged to facilitate their work.
Thus in 1983 China’s population growth rate dropped to 11.54 per 1,UU , 
the first significant drop since 1979. In the intervening years the growth rate 
had risen, despite monumental efforts to lower it. The failure to do so was 
partly the result of the demographic composition of the population of course 
L well as the passage of a new marriage law in 1981 that produced a spur of 
new marriages that year. More fundamentally, however, it was the result o 
the gap between program goals and organizational capabilities, ^^S^-p w ic 
was greatly exacerbated by the ongoing rural reform process. In that en­
vironment, the effectiveness of both administrative methods and mobihza- 
Zal techniques were impaired. Similarly, the decline in 1983’s growth rate 
was due not only to the passing of the most acute phase of the demographic 
crisis, but also to the most effective use of the combined techniques o^f regula­
tion and mobilization since the dramatic introduction of the one-child policy
I^fight of the declining population growth rates in 1983 and 1984, should 
the implementation of population policy be viewed as a success. Despite 
these more recent achievements, China failed to achieve its targeted rates of 
population growth in the early 1980s, and the prospect for holding the 
population to 1.2 billion by the year 2000 is dimming. Using these specific 
criteria to evaluate performance, then, one is led to conclude that imple 
mentation of the one-child-per-couple policy has been less than successful. 
However, if one’s standard of evaluation is not the attainment of specific 
numerical goals, but is rather the impact of China’s population-control drive 
in increasing the number of one-child households and dramatically reducing 
the number of third or more births, providing increasingly reliable fami y- 
planning services at the grass roots, and sustaining an extensive family­
planning propaganda effort geared toward altering traditional childbearing 
Ltitudes and preferences, then the process of policy implementation mus e 
considered a success. An important caveat, however, is that these achieve-
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merits have come at the cost of serious negative side effects—female infanti­
cide, the use of coercion, and violence against family-planning cadres.
Ultimately, judgment of the success or failure of population control in 
China must be made in light of the enormity of the task at hand: attempting 
to restrict most couples of childbearing age to only one child, enforcing the 
policy for a time span of at least two decades, and making the attempt in a 
developing country with a rural population of eight hundred million. From 
this perspective, China’s failure to attain exceedingly ambitious short-term 
goals appears less important than the substantial gains that have been made 
in depressing the rate of population growth to a level much lower than would 
otherwise be expected. Indeed, viewed against the backdrop of a rapidly 
changing rural environment, one in which the mechanisms of political and 
economic control were destabilized and local authority patterns disrupted, 
these “limited” achievements are phenomenal. In short, given the myriad of 
generic problems in enforcing family planning, and the specific obstacles to 
implementation in the Chinese context, a qualihed success is perhaps the 
best that could be expected.
